Constructing a Gender-oriented Mode for Modern Citizenship by Wang, Yongxiang et al.
Volume 7, No. 4 
32 
 
Constructing a Gender-oriented Mode for Modern Citizenship  
 
Yongxiang WANG
a
  Jingping LI
b
  Zhonghua GUO
c
     
 
a
 
b
 Department of Humanities and Social Science, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, 710049, 
China. 
c
 School of Government, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China, 510275, China.                                     
Email: lpsgzh@yahoo.com.cn, wyxiang2011@stu.xjtu.edu.cn                                                                         
 
Abstract:                                                                                                     
The divide of the public-private spheres exists in traditional citizenship. The public mainly 
represents men’s discourse. Women are constrained within the private sphere of the home by 
child-rearing responsibilities. Therefore, traditional citizenship tends to be male-biased. After 
criticizing the false universalism of traditional citizenship, based on Iris Marion Young’s 
differentiated citizenship and Ruth Lister’s woman-friendly citizenship, this study rethinks the 
body politics, political space, and political behavior, and attempts to construct a 
gender-oriented citizenship that encompasses intimate relationship and civic friendship, in 
which women’s experiences and identities are recognized.                                                              
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1. INTRODUCTION                                                                                    
The relationship between individuals and the state has always been one of the most 
fundamental problems in human society. It is also an important academic problem in political 
philosophy, referring to how to construct a positive relationship between citizens and the 
political community. Practical explorations and theoretical thinking about the issue in western 
society originate from the civic politics of the city-state in the ancient Greek and Plato's 
‘Utopia’, and stretch so far. Citizenship implies rich political, philosophical and social cultural 
meanings. On one hand, the theory of citizenship is indeed important theoretical resource for 
resolving the relationship between the individual and the community. On the other hand, 
citizenship is closely linked to the development of western democratic politics. If we are to 
measure the civilized level of political community, one of the main standards is to see what 
kind of forms and status are available for individuals to participate in political life. Only giving 
the individual the title of citizenship is not enough to declare that the individual is a real citizen, 
because a real citizen, as the main body of political community, implies the enjoyment of civil 
rights, political rights and social rights, and various obligations corresponding to the rights.                                                                                                                                                         
Meanings of ‘citizenship’ are shaped over time and through cultural struggles (Kathleen Knight 
Abowitz 2006). Citizenship in a democracy (a) gives membership status to individuals within a 
political unit; (b) confers an identity on individuals; (c) constitutes a set of values, usually 
interpreted as a commitment to the common good of a particular political unit; (d) involves 
practicing a degree of participation in the process of political life; and (e) implies gaining and 
using knowledge and understanding of laws, documents, structures, and processes of 
governance (Enslin 2000). Regarding the definition of citizenship, many today fall back on that 
provided by T. H. Marshall: “Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of 
a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with 
which the status is endowed”. Citizenship should include “Three parts, or elements, civil, 
political and social. The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual 
freedom-liberty of the person…By the political element I mean the right to participate in the 
exercise of political power…By the social element I mean the whole rang from the right to a 
modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage 
and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.”  
(1950, 10-11) These rights were considered to have been steadily built up, first civil rights, then 
political, lastly social. However, women did not have the ‘civil’ right to work at the occupation 
of their choice, since there were so many restrictions on the forms of employment open to 
women, ranging from the marriage bar in many white collar employments to lack of access to 
skilled manual labour since they were denied access to apprenticeships (Banks 1981; Drake 
1920; Holcombe 1983; Walby 1990). Therefore, traditional citizenship mainly represents men’s 
discourses. Women’s status as citizens is marked by inequality, underrepresentation, 
discrimination, and subordination. Citizenship is a broader concept than class rights. It should 
be retained with its modern connotations of all adults participating in a full democracy.                                                                                        
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Although many scholars have made lots of researches on citizenship, the absence of gender 
from writings on citizenship, such as those of Marshall, Mann and Turner, causes problems for 
the understanding of citizenship. Debates as how gender can be integrated into citizenship 
highlight major divergences in feminist theory over the relationship between the public and the 
private. Citizenship cannot be understood without a dynamic theory of gender relations. This 
study not only attempts to enrich the theory of citizenship, but also seek an approach that 
enables women to gain full citizenship gradually on a more practical level.                                                                                        
As a feminist, Iris Marion Young’s theories have been part of the ongoing project of feminist 
critique and gender discourse. The fundamental presuppositions of contemporary political 
philosophy should be changed, and we need a new politics that “recognizes rather than 
represses differences,” a vision of a “heterogeneous public that acknowledges and affirms 
group differences,” a vision expressed in the ideal of city life (as against the celebration of a 
homogeneous “community”) as the “openness to unassimilated otherness.” (Young 1990) “A 
democratic public should provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and representation 
of the distinct voices and perspectives of those its constituent groups that are oppressed or 
disadvantaged” (1990). Ruth Lister, another feminist, proposes a woman-friendly citizenship. 
The notion of human agency helps us to knit individual rights and political participation 
together (2003). Citizenship as participation can be understood as rights enables people to 
exercise their agency as citizens. As citizenship rights remain the object of political struggles to 
defend, reinterpret and extend them, a dynamic is set in motion in which the rights and 
participatory elements of citizenship stand in a dialectical relationship with one another. 
Re-gendering citizenship in this way is particularly important in challenging the construction of 
women as passive victims, while not losing sight of the structural and institutional constraints 
on their ability to act as citizens. We should reconstruct citizenship’s yardstick so that it no 
longer privileges the male through its false universalism (2003). We need a synthesis of the 
gender-differentiated model and gender-neutral model, within the framework of 
gender-pluralism, which, in the words of Pateman, enables “the substance of equality differs 
according to the diverse circumstances and capacities of citizens, men and women” (1992, 29). 
Pivotal to the construction of the synthesis is the disruption of the public-private spheres sculpts 
the gendered contours of citizenship. From a policy perspective, this means, above all, 
measures to shift the gendered division of labour and to create the conditions in which both 
women and men can combine paid work and caring responsibilities (Lister 1997, 1999b). Thus 
the re-gendering of citizenship will require change in both public and private spheres and in 
men’s as well as women’s relationship to citizenship. Although Iris Marion Young and Ruth 
Lister have made some contributions to the reconstruction of traditional citizenship, there are 
still some defects in their theories. Therefore, there is still some space for this study to perform.                                                                                   
This study is divided into three main parts. The first introduces some critiques to the traditional 
citizenship. The second expounds the differentiated citizenship and Ruth Lister’s 
woman-friendly citizenship, which are the theoretical basis for this study. The third rethinks the 
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body politics, the political space, and political behavior, and then attempts to propose a theory 
of gender-oriented citizenship based on intimate relationship and civic friendship.                                                                 
2. CRITICIZING THE TRADITIONAL CITIZENSHIP                                                                                         
A series of dichotomies exist in traditional citizenship. The divide of the public-private spheres 
is the most fundamental. The public sphere is mainly for men, while women are mainly 
constrained within the private sphere. Some feminists criticize and expose the gender 
discrimination meanings within the tradition of liberal and republican citizenship. 
In civic republican discourse, there is exclusivity on civic membership in the political 
community. Civic republicanism stresses on the need for better civic literacy and the 
importance of a central body of civic knowledge for good citizenship, and requires 
identification with and commitment to the political community’s goals, gained through the 
processes of education and active engagement in the democratic process (Ravitch and Viteritti 
2001). The democracy of Aristotle’s Athens is an established model, in that citizens derived 
their self-understandings through identification with and participation in the polis, or political 
community, where only a small group of adults were actually given rights of citizenship. Civic 
republican discourse largely maintains the benefits of exclusivity, “in choosing an identity for 
ourselves, we recognize both who our fellow citizens are, and those who are not members of 
our community, and thus who are potential enemies” (Oldham 1998, 81). In the tradition of 
civic republicanism, rationality and freedom overwhelm particular need, interest, and desire; 
citizenship is an expression of the universality of human life (Young 1990).                                                                                      
Another powerful force in shaping contemporary meanings of citizenship is liberalism which 
reflects the belief that there is less relative social agreement on values, chosen identities, and 
forms of democratic participation than is assumed by the civic republican discourse 
(McLaughlin 1992; Strike 1994). The meanings of the ideal of universal citizenship includes: 
(1) universality defined as general in opposition to particular; what citizens have in common as 
opposed to how they differ; (2) universality in the sense of laws and rules that say the same for 
all and apply to all in the same way; laws and rules that are blind to individuals and group 
differences (Young 1989, 250-274). The strict distinction between the public and the private 
leads to discrimination against women（Lister 2003）. It is precisely this public/private divide 
that has made women’s participation in formal politics so difficult (Eisenstein 1981; Okin 1989; 
Pateman 1988). Table1below indicates the dichotomies in detail.                                                                                                                                        
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Table1 the dichotomies exist in traditional citizenship (Ruth Lister 2003) 
the public sphere; men; citizen              the private sphere; women; non-citizen                     
abstract; unrealistic; thoughtful                     particular; realistic; natural                                
rational; useful                                 emotional; irrational; obedient                          
unbiased standards of justice and  ideals                                      desire and passion; cannot use standards of justice                                     
just; care common interest                      prejudice; busy with private affairs and family affairs                                                         
independent; positive; heroic; strong                    dependent; passive; weak                           
in favor of freedom and human kingdom                                    maintain the realm of necessity and natural kingdom                                             
Table1 indicates that the substantive characteristics of citizens in the public sphere are rational, 
independent, and active, while women are considered as irrational, dependent and passive. The 
role of carer is disproportionately taken by women (Abel and Nelson 1990; Finch and Groves 
1983; Glendinning 1990; Mayall 1990; Morris 1990). Yet this role as carer places women at a 
disadvantage in access to income (Glendinning 1990) and more broadly in relation to political 
and social citizenship (Lister 1990; Nelson 1984). Women’s long-standing exclusion from the 
theory and practice of citizenship is far from accidental and only partially rectified by their 
formal incorporation in virtually all societies in the twentieth century. Traditional citizenship 
has particular discrimination implications for women, who are disadvantaged by the sexual 
division of time. The narrow conception of the ‘political’ of traditional citizenship built on a 
generally, rigid separation of the public-private spheres (Lister 1997).                                                                                                                                                                
Civic republicanism and political liberalism provide rich ideological frameworks that should 
continue to shape our language and thinking about citizenship, structuring both our sense of 
civic reality and our own identities as citizens (Mills 1997). However, these discourses are far 
more wide spread in scholarly and theoretical texts than in practical, applied curricular texts. To 
challenge the traditional liberal and republican citizenship, feminist discourses of citizenship 
raise many questions about how citizenship has been framed within gendered thinking and 
constructions. Feminist citizenship discourses are currently “challenging the lions that guard 
the canonical literature on citizenship” (Jones 1998, 222). Although “citizenship has existed for 
nearly three millennia, with very minor exceptions, women have had some share in civic rights 
in the most liberal states for [only] about a century” (Heater 2004, 203). Feminist citizenship 
discourses have questioned and shifted the “meanings of such concepts as rights, needs, 
dependency, entitlements and democratic participation. Equally, they have sought strategic 
transformation of the relations of power which configure the terms of inclusion and exclusion 
in the polity” (Kenway and Langmead 2000, 313). A key reference point in this discourse is the 
public/private divide that pervades much political thinking in the Western world (Elshtain 
1981). “Beginning with Aristotle, influential political theorists argued that women’s 
reproductive function destined them for the private sphere,” while their male counterparts 
participated in public life (Smith 1999, 141).                                                                                        
Journal of Cambridge Studies 
37 
Feminist discourses question whether democratic citizenship is itself such a gendered, 
patriarchal concept as to require a complete transformation to live up to its inclusive ideals 
(Assiter 1999, 141). “Feminist campaigns to break down the gendering of public and private 
spheres, or indeed to achieve equality for women in the public sphere, strike at the heart of a 
gendered discourse of western European notions of democracy” (Arnot 1997, 279). Liberal 
feminism has generally argued for women’s full inclusion in the political sphere, objecting to 
women’s “relative lack of access to conventional arenas of political decision making, as well as 
to women’s unequal representation in leadership positions in radical organizations for political 
change” (Jones 1998, 225). In liberal feminism, there is a reliance on the discourses of political 
liberalism to shape arguments for women’s agency, rights, and autonomy (Dillabough and 
Arnot 2000). Difference feminists take another approach to the public/private dualism. Rather 
than perceiving gender difference to be a deficiency of women, these feminist theorists advance 
women’s difference as a sign of strength or even superiority. The public sphere, with its values 
of universalism, reason, and logic, can benefit from the values and skills that women have 
developed as a result of both their long confinement in the private sphere of family and child 
rearing and their biological abilities to reproduce. Difference feminists, such as those espousing 
the power of “maternal thinking”, have argued that women’s differences from men chiefly their 
capacities for ‘relationality’ and care should not be compromised but should be used in their 
roles as citizens (Ruddick 1989). Postmodern feminists seek to combat various types of 
oppression that keep women and others absent or silent in the political world. A public sphere 
is needed that is more particularistic and sensitive to the differences and pluralities of people, 
especially those who have faced various forms of oppression (Young 1990). We should call for 
spaces and forms of public expression that are radically open to all who wish to “raise and 
address issues of the moral value or human desirability of an institution or a practice whose 
decisions affect a large number of people” (73). In such public expression, “consensus and 
sharing may not always be the goal.” Rather, “the recognition and appreciation of differences, 
in the context of confrontation with power”, also is prioritized (76). Citizenship is posed as a 
problem, a category in which cultural difference is erased: “procedural liberalism is officially 
proclaimed to be difference neutral and universal but is predicated upon group membership in 
which the White, heterosexual Anglo male of property is the prime signifier” (Spinner 1994, 
113). Reconstructionist texts express values of inclusion, equality, and the open embrace of 
difference. Feminist constructions of citizenship urge us to rethink the whole civic project, 
attempting to remake an essentially male realm into one that is hospitable to the diverse 
interests of women. Feminists are highly suspicious of the masculinist origins of civic 
republicanism, and republicanism has had a long history of disdain for ‘femininity’ in politics.                                                                        
Analyzing the critiques to traditional citizenship, we know that the traditional citizenship is 
strictly limited to rational public sphere, while the private sphere is based on family life. 
Citizenship as both a theory and practice operates simultaneously as a force for both inclusion 
and exclusion. Women have been denied the full and effective title of citizen for much of 
history, ancient and modern. The twentieth century mainstream theorization of citizenship has 
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tended to ignore the ways in which women’s gradual achievement of civil, political and social 
rights often followed a different pattern from men’s. Feminists revealed how, in both theory 
and practice, despite it claims to universalism, citizenship has been quintessentially male. 
Nowhere was this more obvious than in classical Greece where the active participation of male 
citizens in the public sphere was predicated on women’s labour in the ‘private’ domestic sphere 
which rendered them as unfit for citizenship. The public-private divides, and the male-female 
qualities associated with it, stands at the heart of the gendered citizenship relationship. This is 
upheld by the ‘private’ side to which embodied women are relegated and from whence they are 
deemed incapable of developing the ‘male’ qualities of citizenship (Pateman 1989). The 
continued power of this deeply gendered dichotomy has meant that women’s admission to 
citizenship has been on male terms. It has also meant that much mainstream theorizing about 
citizenship continues to discount the relevance of what happens in the private sphere to the 
practice of citizenship in the public sphere. Thus, for example, it ignores the ways in which the 
gendered division of labour in the private sphere shapes the access of both women and men to 
the public sphere and to the political, economic and social rights of citizenship which derive 
from such access (Lister 1997). More positively, citizenship is seen by many as an analytical 
and political tool of considerable potential value (Walby 1994; Lister 1997; Yuval-Davis 1997; 
Bussemaker and Voet 1998; Voet 1998). In order to realize the emancipatory potential of 
citizenship, we must reconstruct the traditional citizenship.                                                                                      
3. DIFFERENTIATED CITIZENSHIP AND WOMAN-FRIENDLY 
CITIZENSHIP                                           
By criticizing the false universalism of traditional citizenship, Iris Marion Young proposes 
differentiated citizenship, and Ruth Lister proposes woman-friendly citizenship, which 
constitute the theoretical basis for the construction of gender-oriented citizenship.                                                           
3.1 Iris Marion Young’s Differentiated Citizenship                                                                            
Young exposes the false universalism of traditional citizenship correctly, and argues that we 
need a group differentiated citizenship and a heterogeneous public space instead of a universal 
citizenship and a homogeneous public sphere. The concept of differentiated citizenship is the 
best way to realize the inclusion and participation of everyone in full citizenship. Politics of 
differences imply that the decision-making bodies of community must consider group identities 
in the decision-making process.                                                                                                  
Modern society is assumed to be group differentiated. However, in our political life, some of 
our groups are privileged and others are oppressed. What is oppression? A group is oppressed 
when one or more of the following conditions occur to all or a large portion of its members: (1) 
the benefits of their work or energy go to others without those others reciprocally benefiting 
them (exploitation); (2) they are excluded from participation in major social activities, which in 
our society means primarily a workplace (marginalization); (3) they live and work under the 
authority of others, and have little work autonomy and authority over others themselves 
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(powerlessness); (4) as a group they are stereotyped at the same time that their experience and 
situation is invisible in the society in general, and they have little opportunity and little 
audience for the expression of their experience and perspective on social events (cultural 
imperialism); (5) group members suffer random violence and harassment motivated by group 
hatred or fear (Young 1989, 250-274).                                                                      
We must develop participatory democratic theory on the assumption that there are group 
differences and that some groups are actually or potentially oppressed or disadvantaged（1989）. 
A democratic public should provide institutionalized means and mechanisms for the explicit 
recognition and representation of oppressed or disadvantaged groups. Such group 
representation implies institutional mechanisms and public resources supporting three activities: 
(1) self-organization of group members so that they gain a sense of collective empowerment 
and a reflective understanding of their collective experience and interests in the context of the 
society; (2) voicing a group’s analysis of how social policy proposals affect them, and 
generating policy proposals themselves, in institutionalized contexts where decision makers are 
obliged to show that they have taken these perspectives into consideration; (3) having veto 
power regarding specific policies that affect a group directly, for example, reproductive rights 
for women (1989, 250-274). To have all group represented in the public is the only way to have 
their experience and social perspectives voiced, heard, and taken account of.                                                                               
What should be the mechanisms of group representation? The self-organization of the group is 
one of the aspects of a principle of group representation (1989). Members of the group must 
meet together in democratic forums to discuss issues and formulate group positions and 
proposals. This principle of group representation should be understood as a part of a larger 
program for democratic decision-making processes. Public life and decision-making processes 
should be transformed so that all citizens have significantly greater opportunities for 
participation in discussion and decision making. In such a more participatory democratic 
scheme, members of oppressed groups would also have group assemblies, which would 
delegate group representatives (1989, 250-274).                                               
The differentiated citizenship, building on the basis of recognition of difference and diversity 
rather than the homogeneity of community, provides good views for this study. However, in the 
differentiated citizenship, difference is placed before equality, which brings a lot of controversy 
that it runs the danger of freezing group identities, suppressing differences within groups and 
impeding wider solidarities (Mouffe 1992; Phillips 1993). More fluid pluralist approaches, 
which are less prone to these dangers, have been articulated around the notion of a “politics of 
difference” (Yeatman 1993); a “transversal politics” (Yuval-Davis 1997); a “politics of 
solidarity in difference” (Lister 1997) and a “reflective solidarity” (Dean 1996). Mouffe (1992) 
critiques difference feminists for essentializing the category of woman-melding “woman-ness” 
down to one central quality or thing. Citizenship is not simply one identity but allows for “a 
plurality of specific allegiances and for the respect of individual liberty” (378). Emphasis on the 
plurality of women’s oppression-varying by social contexts and factors such as race, nationality, 
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ethnicity, and religion, as well as migration patterns across borders-points to a move in 
citizenship discourses away from singular notions of identity and toward plural identities and 
memberships (Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999).                                                                          
3.2 Ruth Lister’s Woman-Friendly Citizenship                                                                            
Lister’s theory of citizenship bases on a synthesis of rights and participatory approaches to 
citizenship, and links through the notion of human agency. A rounded and fruitful theorization 
of citizenship, which can be of potential value to women, has to embrace both individual rights 
(and, in particular, social and reproductive rights) and political participation and also has to 
analyze the relationship between the two (Sarvasy, Wendy and Siim, Brite 1994, 249-55). 
Citizenship as participation represents an expression of human agency in the political arena, 
broadly defined; citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents. Such a conceptualization 
of citizenship is particularly important in challenging the construction of women (and 
especially minority group women) as passive victims, while keeping sight of the discriminatory 
and oppressive male-dominated political, economic and social institutions which still deny their 
full citizenship (Lister 2003).                                                                                   
In order to avoid women’s exile as a group from full citizenship, we need to locate a gendered 
analysis within the wider framework of difference and the divisions and exclusionary 
inequalities. This represents a conception of citizenship based on a notion of ‘differentiated 
universalism’ which tries to reconcile the universalism that stands at the heart of citizenship 
with the demands of a politics of difference. At the same time, with the reconstruction of the 
public-private dichotomies, these ideas are offered as possible bases in the construction of a 
feminist theory of citizenship, which draws on principles of synthesis rather than dichotomy 
(2003).                                                                     
Three ways are adopted to construct a woman-friendly citizenship. Firstly, the formal politics 
should be more open to the informal politics. Secondly, women’s equal status must be 
emphasized in the decision-making institution. Lastly, the relationship between the formal 
politics and informal politics must be considered seriously. The establishment of woman’s 
citizenship needs to open up formal political arenas to women, and formal politics should be 
more accountable to informal (Lister 2003). Meanwhile, on the basis of absorbing the views of 
universalism and particularism, a range of traditional dichotomies must be gone beyond, 
including equality and difference, justice and care, independence and dependence, the public 
sphere and the private sphere. In the woman-friendly citizenship, women’s informal political 
participation is emphasized, and formal politics are open up to women. Women’s 
representations should appear in formal politics on the grounds that women’s qualities and 
working styles can help to change political culture and political process (2003).                                                                                
On one hand, we should seek solutions for women to stop being exploited at home and enter 
the labour market, “women’s position as the economic dependent of a male partner; as 
double-shift worker juggling the responsibilities of paid employment and caring work; or as 
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welfare benefit recipient struggling to raise children in poverty or to manage on an inadequate 
pension, is incompatible with the full exercise of the social and political rights of citizenship.” 
(Lister 1990, 464) On the other that women’s position as carer should be supported. “The 
institutions of the ‘public sphere’ must do more to accommodate the sexual division of labour 
so long as it shapes and constrains the lives of women and limits their access to the public 
sphere” (1990, 464). Lister both demands the entry of women into the public sphere as the only 
way that their second class status can be ended, and insists that women’s presence in the private 
realm of caring be accommodated. Perhaps she is deliberately asking for both, but these are 
quite different strategic responses. Indeed they underlie many of the issues in the feminist 
debate on gender and citizenship. Should women seek support for their existing roles in the 
family as carers, or should they be seeking to leave such roles behind and enter paid 
employment? Women’s greater commitment to caring is simultaneously positively valued and a 
source of disadvantage to women. The suggestion that women should become like men in order 
to obtain economic and social rights is contentious within the debate on gender and citizenship.                                                          
Women’s informal participation and women’s care responsibility in domestic sphere should be 
taken into account (Lister 2003). However, there are still some problems in Lister’s theories. 
Can we avoid getting stuck in this particular formulation of the traditional ‘equality’ vs. 
‘difference’ dilemma through a synthesis of the two and through a pluralist “conception which 
would accommodate all social cleavages simultaneously” (Leca 1992, 30)? To construct a 
gender-oriented citizenship that is more inclusive of women, only emphasizing women’s 
informal participation is not enough. Men also need to make great efforts. Besides intimate 
relationship, we also need to develop civic friendship between men and women, which is very 
significant for reconstructing the traditional citizenship.                                                                                                           
4. CONSTRUCTING A GENDER-ORIENTED CITIZENSHIP                                                       
The first part of this study introduces some critiques to traditional citizenship. The second part 
expounds Iris Marion Young’s differentiated citizenship that emphasizes the oppressed or 
disadvantaged groups especially women’s special group representation rights, and Ruth Lister’s 
woman-friendly citizenship in which formal politics is changed and become more open to 
informal politics. The two citizenship theories provide some good views for this study, and 
simultaneously there are still some defects. Based on these, this study attempts to develop a 
new mode for modern citizenship. This part below first rethinks the body politics, the political 
space, and the political behavior, and then attempts to propose a gender-oriented citizenship 
based on intimate relationship and civic friendship.                                                                                             
4.1 The Body Politics                                                                                     
In traditional western political discourse, from the origins of political philosophy, women’s 
bodies are considered to be problematic. For Aristotle, women were excluded from 
participating in politics. “Fortune is a woman and, if you wish to keep her down, you must beat 
her and pound her.” (Machiavelli 1964, 176) If female body is not properly contained, it will 
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become dangerous to political order (Rousseau 1979, 46). The presumed limitations of the 
female body have made women exclusive from public life for centuries.                                                                                       
To resolve the discrimination against women of traditional citizenship, we should take into 
account women’s experiences and gender characteristics (Young 1990). It is precisely because 
women's bodies and experiences are different from those of men’s. Women as a group should 
be entitled to special group representation rights (1990). The majority of women continue to be 
constrained within the home by child-rearing responsibilities. “The care of children in their 
infancy is one of the grand duties annexed to the female character by nature.” (Wollstonecraft 
1975, 265) We should ensure the integrity of women's bodies, and let them have the right to 
control their bodies. The integrity of bodies has become the precondition for entering the public 
sphere for women. Otherwise, their subjectivity and citizenship will be affected (Lister 2003).                                                                              
It is vital to think about the political significance of women’s bodies. Until women can 
represent themselves as independent bodies, their citizenship will not be denied one of the 
rights that belonged to all individuals: the right to control one’s body. Women have the rights 
of reproductive freedom on the grounds that women’s bodies belong to them. Therefore, we 
should advocate women’s integrity into the political arena, so that they can be free from the 
oppression of their bodies, which helps eradicate the physical barriers to women’s full inclusion 
in public life. This requires a theory of citizenship that allows for differences in age, color, and 
physical strength, that accommodates particular values and identities.                                                           
4.2 Changing Political Space                                                                                           
In traditional western political theories, the public is fundamentally distinct from the private or 
the personal. The generality of the public depends on excluding women, who are responsible 
for private affairs, and lack the dispassionate rationality and independence that good citizens 
are required of. Therefore, women are excluded and isolated from different political arenas.                                                       
The public life should not be asked to create a unified public sphere, in which citizens discuss 
the universal demand of interests or public good regardless of special groups’ identities and 
histories (Young 1990). A heterogeneous public is required, in which the oppressed or 
disadvantaged groups deserve specific representation, and participants discuss together the 
issues before them and are supposed to come to a decision that they determine as best or most 
just (Young 1989, 267). Both the citizenship and the political space should be redefined in 
broad terms so as to encompass a kind of informal politics (Lister, 1997). Women’s 
involvement in community organizations can be more personally fruitful than engagement in 
formal politics which are often experienced as more alienating and empowering (Coot, Anna 
and Pattullo, Polly 1990). Women who previously did not see themselves as in any political are 
becoming advocates for social change (Hyatt, Susan 1992). Under constant renegotiation, the 
public-private divides should be reconstructed. If we don’t take into account the sexual division 
of labor in the private, we can’t understand the gendered patterns of entry to citizenship in the 
public sphere (Lister, 2003). The case for care as a resource for political citizenship has been 
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put by Bubeck (1995) on the grounds that the private concerns, values, skills and 
understandings associated with the practice of caring can all enhance public practices of 
citizenship. One arena in which men can do so, in particular, is that of informal, often 
community-based, politics, which is often grounded in concerns which derive from women’s 
responsibilities for care (Lister, 1997). “The rights to time to care and to receive care are 
protected as part of a more inclusive approach to citizenship (Knijn and Kremer 1997, 357).                                                                                                      
The altered political space has a transformative effect on the values of both of the private and 
the public worlds. When issues defined as personal problems are expressed in public terms, it 
reconstructs the public space. For example, marches against sexual harassment, rape, and 
pornography on college campuses are examples of a new definition of participation, which 
focus on the alteration of public space itself (Kathleen Jones 1990, 781-812). A more inclusive 
political science will require changes of formal political system, and be more open to single 
woman and various informal politics. Women’s positive participations are more obvious in 
informal political sphere, such as in local communities, national and international ‘new social 
movements’. Women have constituted political interests which should be reflected in 
decision-making process in the public sphere, and what’s more, the community can benefit 
from the characteristics that women have brought to the formal political arena (Lister 2003). 
Citizenship should not be limited only to traditional forms of political participation. 
‘Particularized contacting’ of the government by citizens to resolve ‘some problem whose 
relevance is limited to the individual or the family’ also is political participation (Sidney Verba 
1978).                                                    
4.3 Changing Political Behavior                                                                                          
In traditional politics, political action has been limited largely to formal interactions between 
citizens and the state. Traditional forms of participation, such as voting and campaign activities 
are approved. However, the fact that economic marginality has a great impact on women’s 
political participation has been ignored.                                                                                                    
“Instead of seeing citizenship as the means to realize rights, we should see rights as one of the 
means to realize equal citizenship. This implies that feminism ought to be more than a 
movement for women’s rights; it ought to be a movement for women’s participation.”(Rian 
Voet 1998, 73) Mary Dietz advocates “a vision of citizenship” which is “expressly political and, 
more exactly, participatory and democratic”. In this vision, politics involves “the collective and 
participatory engagement of citizens in the determination of the affairs of their community” and 
we conceive of ourselves as “speakers of words and doers of deeds mutually participating in the 
public realm”. It is only, she contends, when active political participation is valued as an 
expression of citizenship in contrast to the “politically barren” construction of the “citizen as 
bearer of rights” alone, that feminists will “be able to claim a truly liberatory politics of their 
own” (1987, 13-15). Other feminists, sympathetic to Dietz’s vision, such as Anne Phillips 
(1991, 1993) and Iris Young (1989, 1990), nevertheless caution against an uncritical reading of 
civic republicanism which, inter alia, defines the political in narrow terms and ignores the 
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domestic constraints on many women’s political participation. Women are more willing to 
participate in informal politics, and we should not deny the role of women’s social movements 
(Lister 2003) which promote women’s political views, and change the theories and practices of 
citizenship (Andrew Feenberg 1988, 126-56). In addition, economic marginalization has 
influenced women's political activities. Compared to men, women are more vulnerable to the 
threat of poverty. Particularly, the gender division of labor in the private field makes men and 
women enter the labor market with different terms. The operation of labor market clearly 
benefits men, which further deepens women’s roles and status in the family (Lister 2003). 
Nevertheless, placing value on informal politics as an expression of citizenship does not mean 
ignoring the continuing need both to open up formal political arenas to women and also to 
make formal politics more accountable to informal (Lister 1997, 28-48).                                                                   
Thus, our new theory of citizenship should not be limited only to traditional forms of 
participation. On the contrary, we need a new definition of political participation. Resolving 
“some problem whose relevance is limited to the individual or the family” is also political 
participation (Sidney Verba 1978). The new forms of participation are less bureaucratic, more 
democratic, and more personalized. By focusing on citizenship obligation, we can turn 
conventional understanding of citizenship on their head through the introduction “of a revised 
conception of citizenship in which the performance of her or his share of care has become a 
general citizen’s obligation” (Diemut Bubeck 1995, 29). The re-gendering of citizenship needs, 
first, to embrace both individual rights (and in particular social and reproductive rights) and 
political participation, broadly defined to include informal modes of politics, and, second, to 
analyze the relationship between the two (Sarvasy and Siim, 1994).                                                                          
4.4 A Gender-Oriented Citizenship Based on Intimate Relationship and Civic 
Friendship                                         
Through rethinking the body politics, the political space, and the political behavior, based on 
differentiated citizenship and woman-friendly citizenship, we can conclude that a new theory of 
gender-oriented citizenship must cover the following topics: it revaluates women’s values and 
practices, and searches for a political community which reflects and supports women’s complex 
positions and status. Women’s experiences are not considered as private affairs completely. We 
can develop political meanings from women’s experiences and activities as nurturers and 
caregivers, and the new citizenship is rooted in women’s experiences. Some qualities of 
women’s experiences can be applied to the decision-making process in the public sphere (Lister, 
1997). Taking the place of the more distant and alienated interactions of citizens of bureaucratic 
systems, the new theory of gender-oriented citizenship is based on intimate forms of interaction 
and friendship groups.                                                                                                                
The intimate relationship and civic friendship can be applied to the construction of a 
gender-oriented citizenship, in which women cannot only gain formal political rights, but also 
can gain full citizenship on practical level. The term “intimacy” embraces two meanings. The 
first meaning of intimacy is similar to one of the meanings of privacy: a sort of information 
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about a person is kept secret and not normally disclosed widely. Nevertheless, intimacy has 
another different meaning, which is more important for the construction of a gender-oriented 
citizenship in this paper, referring to a type of close and enduring association between people, 
so it emphasizes the intimate forms of interaction between people, including the interaction 
between women and men. Thus intimate friends share an intimate and close relationship, which 
helps women and men communicate with and understand each other well. Thus, the second 
meaning is the central value of intimate in this study. Among theorists who propose the concept 
of intimate citizenship, Plummer is an outstanding representative. According to recent critiques 
of traditional understandings of citizenship that widen the notion to include differentiated forms 
of citizenship, Plummer applies the concept of intimate citizenship that “examines rights, 
obligations, recognitions and respect around the most intimate spheres of life”, such as family 
life, sexuality or gender (K. Plummer 2001, 237–253). The term means that people have the 
right to choose how they organize their personal lives and to advocate identities in 
decision-making process in the public sphere. Moreover, by elaborating visible and positive 
cultures that invade broader public spheres, these groups contribute to their members’ struggles 
for full citizenship. The intimate citizenship which promotes affectionate solidarity, such as 
friendship, and attempts to bring convergence to some issues can become the best tie between 
these groups. “Stories of intimate citizenship” may thus be the most appropriate mode of 
communication (Ken Plummer 2003). The concept of intimate citizenship that Plummer 
delineates does not neglect issues relevant to women and sexuality.                                               
Related to intimacy, friendship can also serve for constructing a gender-oriented citizenship. 
The earliest systematic attempt to establish the political relevance of friendship originates from 
Aristotle, who argues that friendship can serve as a normative model for the practice of 
citizenship, and defines friendship as three sorts respectively based on utility, pleasure, and 
virtue. As he argues famously in The “Nicomachean Ethics”, friendship based on virtue is the 
most perfect type, in which citizens view one another as civic friends, and on the matters of 
public policy, these civic friends will come together in a broad consensus. However, in 
Aristotle’s scheme, many marginalized groups with potentially differing interests are excluded 
from the political community, such as women, slaves, and persons of foreign descent. 
Therefore, to a certain degree, the meanings of friendship applied in the article are different 
from those of Aristotle’s. The term “friendship” in this article includes two meanings of truth 
and tenderness. Furthermore, the practice of friendship is dynamic, which grows and evolves 
over time. Friendship allows citizenship to develop towards noninstrumental directions. A 
noninstrumental value emphasizes responsiveness or receptivity to others, and the membership 
in a community is equal, based on openness and empathy, rather than merely on contractual 
obligations. Meanwhile, we should promote civic friendship within a heterogeneous 
community.                                                                             
It is easy for us to understand friendship on the grounds that we have all experienced friendship 
and know its norms intimately, even if we practice them imperfectly. The norms of friendship 
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are at least available and familiar to anyone who has, or has been, a friend. However, this does 
not mean that there are not also significant differences the attitudes towards friendship in 
different traditions beyond some basic norms. Nevertheless, despite of these differences, there 
are enough potential similarities between conceptions of friendship to provide a basis for 
intercultural discussion and cross-cultural understanding. The practice of liberal citizenship 
would be improved if these common norms can be brought to citizenship. New perspectives 
and viewpoints can be introduced to us by a friend, who shares with us a new experience or 
way of life, or even enhances our awareness of the variousness and possibility of human life 
itself. The communicative norms of friendship can serve as constrains on disagreements 
between members of modern societies who often have different values, competing interests, 
and conflicting understanding of the good.                                                        
By theorizing about citizenship in terms of friendship, we can enrich the contemporary practice 
of citizenship with its two crucial communicative norms (truth and tenderness) (James R. 
Martel 2001). Among the norms of friendship, the two communicative constrains of truth and 
tenderness is most important. In the context of friendship, truth means a practice of frankness 
and openness to the frank speech of one’s friend. A kind of mutual understanding or at least a 
willingness to work toward mutual understanding is needed when the bonds of friendship 
develops. A mode of “unconstrained” public discourse, which requires members of a society to 
articulate their true commitments, desire, needs, projects, etc, would theoretically promote a 
community in which the true needs and purposes of individuals are considered. There is no 
guarantee that any particular view or vision of social justice would emerge from a condition of 
improved mutual understanding between citizens. Nevertheless, one would expect rival views 
or visions of justice to receive proper hearings. And, any consensus concerning principles of 
justice that emerged from such hearings would be the result of the process and practice of 
politics. The basic meaning of tenderness is something like “kindness” or “affection”. The 
practice of tenderness helps to introduce individuals to the variousness of human life and helps 
them achieve a distinctly democratic connectedness with others. By practicing truth and 
tenderness, the two crucial norms of friendship, relations between fellow citizens also can 
slowly develop, and can gradually come to be characterized by a more open form of 
deliberation, a more stable form of disagreement, and a more truly democratic connectedness. 
If the norms cultivated within friendships are transferable to political communities, then people 
who understand what it means to be a good friend also will know something, although not 
everything, about what it means to be a good citizen. Friendship will not become the concrete 
basis for the state. Rather, people will practice good citizenship, at least initially, because they 
recognize that the same norms that work for friendship will also work to preserve and 
strengthen modern liberal societies, even in the face of inevitable disagreement between 
members with different values and interests.                                                                    
The new citizenship based on intimate relationship and civic friendship reflects that the rights 
and responsibilities of citizenship play their roles not only in our political lives, but also in our 
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private lives. Applying the principles of citizenship to the relations between individuals does 
not mean that the relationship based on citizenship will cover the whole human relations, 
neither that the division between the public sphere and the private sphere will be completely 
eliminated. The reciprocal philosophy of rights and responsibilities will be applied to general 
human relationships. A deep concept of citizenship requires that we can’t separate the identity 
of human from the identity as citizen, and we cannot adopt clear and unchangeable division 
between the private life and the public life. What is closely related with the new theory of 
citizenship is the democratization of the private sphere. Regardless of whether the concepts of 
rights and responsibilities adopt formal legal form, they generally enter into the field of 
personal relationships. Social policies must set up a network of rights and obligations for family 
members. The concepts of care and sympathy have been brought to the new theory of 
citizenship in order to resolve the dichotomy between reason and emotion. Women’s 
experiences as mothers and caregivers can make them tend to develop a kind of politics 
focusing on relationship. Through bringing the value of care to citizenship, we are more likely 
to build intimate relationship and civic friendship in both the public and private spheres. The 
new theory of citizenship requires that we must strengthen the rights and responsibilities 
expressed by conventional official language while sympathy and responsibility have been 
introduced to various relationships both in the public and private spheres.                                                                                   
In the new theory of citizenship, intimate forms of interaction take place of distant and 
alienated interactions of citizens of bureaucratic systems. The modes of political life are based 
on idealized models of the family and on friendship groups. As the cement of a social order, 
functional ties are replaced by affective ones. The pursuit of instrumental goals is replaced by 
the creative development of personality, and a shared sense of community substitutes the 
competitive norms of capitalist culture. Meanwhile, trust takes the place of suspicion. We can 
use the discourse of kinship and friendship to search for alternative forms of social living 
derived from female experience, forms of living that would stress the emotional as well as the 
cognitive dimensions of human action within a political context which would be more free and 
equal. The relationships regarded as private and personal have political implications. Men can 
communicate with and understand women better.                                                                                
The new theory of citizenship based on intimate relationship and civic friendship transforms the 
characteristics of traditional citizenship in at least three ways. First, the new theory of 
gender-oriented citizenship intensifies the experience of membership by emphasizing that 
belonging to the polity as one belongs to a family and friends. Families and friends tend to 
demand total commitment from their members. It is proper for us to choose a language that 
distinguishes our vision of politics from bureaucratized, utilitarian modes of sociality. The 
traditional political life is characterized by fragmented depersonalized relationships that are 
necessary evils rather than positive goods. In families, individuals are nurtured and cared for as 
persons as opposed to being regarded as functions. Citizens treat one another as friends, and 
can understand each other better.                                       
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Second, in traditional citizenship, the formal connections among citizens are fragile. On the 
contrary, in the new theory of gender-oriented citizenship based on intimate relationship and 
civic friendship can develop a stronger and deeper solidarity. Loyalty in the family and among 
friends is postulated as more continuous and less capricious, whereas loyalty to the modern 
state is often a tenuous and fragile relationship. Therefore, familial and friendship relations 
involve not simply certain aspects of the individual, but all dimensions of a person. The kinds 
of psychological bonds that tie the individual to the family and to friends are arguably more 
complex than the connections between the individual and the state. Body, heart, and will are 
involved intimately in family life and among friends. Third, the variousness of human life has 
been recognized and introduced to the theory of citizenship. Women and men can achieve a 
distinctly democratic connectedness with each other. Members of modern society can come 
together in the public sphere in a broad consensus. Disagreement can be resolved by the norms 
of communication. Women can express their values, desires, needs freely.                                              
The expectation of the new theory of gender-oriented citizenship is that these caretaking 
relations will be reciprocal and no longer identified as necessarily women’s or certain woman’s 
responsibilities. The traditional concept of citizenship assumes the necessity of annihilating all 
other particular loyalties to locality, family, sex, class, and race in order for citizenship to 
become a relationship among equals. A different implication is that the traditional concept of 
citizenship depends on the assumption of a combative, oppositional perspective on political 
action that has been associated, symbolically, with a masculinist process (Bettina Aptheker 
1989). The attempt to suffuse a notion of citizenship with the intimacy and particularity of 
these other bonds, like the maternal one, finds its limit in the traditional concept of citizenship 
itself. A concept of citizenship that is friendly to women and the multiplicity of their interests 
must root in the experiences of women, and the practice and concept of citizenship must be 
transformed to fit these varied experiences, rather than simply transform women to 
accommodate the practice of citizenship as it is traditionally defined.                                                                                                       
5. CONCLUSION                                                                          
A range of dichotomies, especially the public and private dichotomies, exist in the structure of 
traditional citizenship. In the public sphere, citizen is considered as impartiality, rationality, 
independence and political agency while women are deemed less capable of developing these 
“masculine” qualities of citizenship. In traditional citizenship, if women were to become full 
citizens, then women would have to become like men. Women have been denied the full and 
effective title of citizenship from ancient to modern times. In order to resolve the gender 
discrimination problems against women, some scholars criticize the traditional citizenship, such 
as Iris Marion Young who exposes the false universalism of traditional citizenship, and 
proposes a differentiated citizenship. In the differentiated citizenship, oppressed or 
disadvantaged groups’ special rights get emphasized, and women’s values, practices and 
experiences are recognized. Women should have their own representatives in the 
decision-making process in the public sphere. Group differences are included in the 
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differentiated citizenship, and differences are placed before equalities (Young 1990). Different 
from Iris Marion Young’s viewpoints, Ruth Lister argues that equalities should not be given up 
when constructing women’s citizenship. Differentiated universalism can be applied to go 
beyond a series of binary divisions including equality and difference, the ethics of justice and 
care, independence and dependence, the public sphere and the private sphere (Lister 2000). In 
her women-friendly citizenship, women’s informal participations are stressed on. The discourse 
of formal politics is changed for accommodating informal politics. Thus the re-gendering of 
citizenship will require change in both public and private spheres and in men’s as women’s 
relationship to citizenship (Lister 2000). The differentiated citizenship and women-friendly 
citizenship have provided some good views for this study, but there are still some defects in the 
two citizenship theories. Based on these, this study rethinks the body politics, the political 
space, and the political behavior, and proposes a gender-oriented citizenship. The intimate 
relationship and civic friendship can serve for the construction of the new citizenship in which 
women are encompassed. The new theory of gender-oriented citizenship reflects that the rights 
and responsibilities of citizenship play their roles not only in our political lives, but also in our 
private lives, which is different from traditional citizenship. Intimate forms of interaction take 
the place of distant and alienated interactions of citizens of bureaucratic systems. The 
relationship regarded as private and personal have political implications. Women’s experience 
that is positive and politically valuable is stressed on without denying that women have 
different needs and interests from men. Citizenship is redefined to accommodate women’s 
experiences in their concrete, historically changing forms. Therefore, the new theory of 
gender-oriented citizenship proposed in this study can help women obtain full citizenship 
gradually.    
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